On Demand Data Analysis and Filtering for Inaccurate Flight Trajectories by Zanin, Massimiliano et al.
On Demand Data Analysis and Filtering for
Inaccurate Flight Trajectories
Massimiliano Zanin, David Perez
The Innaxis Research Institute, Spain
{mzanin, dp}@innaxis.org
Dimitrios S. Kolovos, Richard F. Paige
Department of Computer Science
University of York, UK
{dkolovos, paige}@cs.york.ac.uk
Kumardev Chatterjee
Thales Group, Belgium
kumardev.chatterjee@thalesgroup.com
Andreas Horst, Bernhard Rumpe
Department of Computer Science
RWTH Aachen University, Germany
{horst, rumpe}@se-rwth.de
Abstract—This paper reports on work performed in the context
of the COMPASS SESAR-JU WP-E project, on developing an ap-
proach for identifying and filtering inaccurate trajectories (ghost
flights) in historical data originating from the EUROCONTROL-
operated Demand Data Repository (DDR).
Foreword—This paper describes a project that is part of
SESAR Workpackage E, which is addressing long-term and
innovative research. The project was started early 2011 so this
description is limited to an outline of the project objectives
augmented by some early findings.
I. INTRODUCTION
COMPASS is a collaborative project funded in the context
of WP-E of the SESAR-JU initiative. The aim of the project
is to investigate the application of techniques such as data
mining, complex event processing, domain-specific modelling
and root-cause analysis for the identification of safety-related
event patterns in the operation of Air Traffic Management
(ATM) systems. The identified patterns will be used for the
development of a new system that will detect their occurrences
in live data and produce early warnings about situations that
– if left to develop – could compromise the safe operation of
an Air Traffic Management (ATM) system.
To identify safety-related patterns which can later on be
detected in the early safety-warning system (ESWS), past
data can be used for mining and analysis. In this paper we
present results of our work on analysing and filtering data from
the Demand Data Repository (DDR), a EUROCONTROL
repository containing historical information for 4D trajectories
of flights crossing the European air space. More specifically,
we report on limitations of the DDR and demonstrate an
approach for filtering out inaccurate flight trajectories (ghost
flights).
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Sec-
tion II provides background and motivation for the problem
and its context. Section III provides an overview of DDR,
discusses the DDR data considered in this work and the
identified limitations – most notably their low temporal and
spatial resolution and the existence of ghost flights. Section
IV discusses the concept of ghost flights in more detail and
presents an approach for identifying and eliminating them
from the DDR data. Section V summarises the findings and
concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND
Air Traffic Management systems are predominantly char-
acterised by complexity and heterogeneity; they encompass
a sophisticated ecosystem of heterogeneous systems and pro-
cedures that ensure the excellent safety records of the avi-
ation industry both on the ground and in the air. ATMs
are predominantly safety-related or safety-critical systems,
since failure in functionality can result in accidents, loss of
property, or loss of life. During the operation of an ATM
system, its components and systems produce a high volume
of system events (e.g. health status of individual devices, tem-
perature/proximity readings), and perform measurements (e.g.
volume of traffic, structural complexity of the airspace). Of
particular interest to safety management are combinations of
events and measurements that can lead to scenarios where the
safe operation of the system is compromised. These scenarios
include situations where uncertainty is high, e.g., weather
conditions that increase the uncertainty of the forecasted
flight path, or where there are a number of complex events
processed. In this context, a major challenge is to identify
such hazardous scenarios as they occur and issue warnings
to human operators sufficiently early, so that they can take
preventative or mitigating actions.
The high volume of potentially interrelated events produced
across the system, and the large number of possible combi-
nations of events that can compromise safety render manual
monitoring and management extremely challenging. The need
for automated mechanisms that can filter and organise high
volumes of heterogeneous, incomplete or unreliable informa-
tion in an intelligent manner is imperative.
The aim of COMPASS is to combine state-of-the-art tech-
nology from the fields of complexity science, data-mining,
intelligent modelling and complex event processing to enable
engineers to mine previously unknown patterns from past
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data. It will allow engineers to filter and enrich these pat-
terns through their expertise using intelligent domain-specific
modelling tools, and then use these patterns to automatically
monitor the running system in order to identify and report
on situations which can compromise the safe operation of the
ATM system.
To achieve this goal, COMPASS concentrates on three
interrelated objectives, which form the basis of its three main
technical work packages. The first objective is to identify
crude patterns of events that have historically led to loss of
safety in ATM systems. This shall be achieved by performing
data mining on large-scale databases containing events related
to incidents where safety was compromised in ATMs in the
past. These crude patterns will then be refined by domain
experts using a tailored domain-specific modelling language
and supporting intelligent modelling tools. Finally, the patterns
defined by domain experts will be used at runtime to monitor
the events produced by the components and sub-systems of an
operating ATM system in order to identify developing pattern
matches and issue early warnings to human operators.
A. Expected Results and Benefits to the ATM community
The project will deliver new safety-related scientific and
technical ATM applications and techniques that go beyond the
nominal SESAR timescales. It will deliver novel automated
safety warning technology that offers promise in reducing the
amount of human intervention in identifying hazardous situa-
tions and generating warnings to ATM experts. In particular,
it will exploit and bring within the scope of SESAR research
and development several novel technologies and theories from
the ICT community tailored for the ATM domain so that they
are easily exploited by ATM engineers, particularly model-
driven engineering, complex event processing and automated
safety warning analysis. Proof of concepts will be delivered
that offer exploitation in the interim period, through use of
standardised ICT technology such as approaches to intelligent
systems modelling, and complex event processing. The CEP
and RCA techniques developed will contribute to the ATM
community by furthering its understanding of emergent be-
haviour demonstrated by complex ATM systems and allow
ATM engineers to reason about it at an appropriate level
of abstraction. The automated early safety warning mech-
anisms proposed will provide warnings early enough that
preventive/corrective measures can be taken to ensure the
safe operation of the ATM system of systems by degrading
its provided services in a graceful manner. Finally, all tasks
performed within the project shall inherently assume non-
determinism (incompleteness, incorrectness, unreliability) in
the involved data addressing a crucial area of concern within
the ATM community. All combined, these techniques offer the
promise of allowing us to increase the amount of automation
in the ATM domain. We see substantial benefits for SESAR
and the ATM domain in adopting and attempting to exploit
concepts, technologies and theories from these specific ICT
contributions. In the medium to long term we argue that these
novel concepts should be exploited within SESAR and that
they hold substantial promise in making a step-change in ATM.
III. HISTORICAL DATA ANALYSIS
The idea of post-analysing historical ATM data to identify
patterns related to safety is not new. Nazeri et al. analysed
global metrics to forecast which air sectors were most incident-
prone [1], and to understand the relation between these global
metrics and the occurrence of incidents [2]. In [3], the spa-
tiotemporal distribution of safety related events provided by
the EUROCONTROL Automatic Safety Monitoring Tool was
analysed. In [4] safety events were studied from a Complexity
Science point of view, by creating a Complex Network and
studying its topological characteristics. In this section, we
present the results of our work on analysing data from the
Demand Data Repository (DDR).
DDR is a repository developed by EUROCONTROL inside
the DMEAN programme, which allows users to access histor-
ical and forecasted air traffic demand, with the main aim of
supporting more efficient operation planning. The repository
contains complete historical information for 4D trajectories
of all flights crossing the European air space, built on Central
Flow Management Unit (CFMU) data, and information related
to the configuration of airspaces and airports (capacities,
runway configurations etc.).
Flight trajectories are codified and stored in segments. For
each one of these segments, several pieces of information
are available: general information about the flight such as
departure and destination airports, aircraft type, and flight
number; coordinates of the initial and final points of the
segment codified by unique identifiers, and by standard 4D
coordinates; phase of the flight, and distance covered. Further-
more, information is organised into two different datasets [5];
for each day of operation, a m1 file contains the trajectories
as reported in the last filed flight plan, while a m3 file
includes corrected information for flights where excessive
vertical, horizontal or time variation compared to flight plan
was detected by radar.
The DDR dataset analysed in the first part of the COMPASS
project extends from the 1st to the 28th of June 2011. The
evolution of the number of segments according to the day is
reported in Fig. 1 (Top), both for the m1 and m3 datasets.
We observe that there is an important difference – of the
order of 5% – in the number of segments corresponding
to the planned and executed flights: this is due to flights
that have been cancelled, but especially to aircraft that have
received direct vectors towards their destination, and therefore
have not crossed several intermediate points. This is further
confirmed by Fig. 1 (Bottom), which illustrates the percentage
of segments, in the m3 dataset, that do not correspond with a
segment in the m1 file.
One of the most important requirements that have been
identified within COMPASS for the historical radar tracks is
high spatial and temporal resolution of the trajectories. The
reason for this is that with a low temporal resolution, it would
not be feasible to understand if the behaviour of an aircraft
(for instance, a level change) has been performed with enough
2
 
 
First SESAR Innovation Days, 29th November - 1st December 2011 
 
 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
620000
640000
660000
680000
700000
720000
740000
760000
780000
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
s
e
g
m
e
n
ts
Day
 m1 files
 m3 files
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
15,0
15,5
16,0
16,5
17,0
17,5
18,0
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
 o
f 
u
n
m
a
tc
h
e
d
 s
e
g
m
e
n
ts
Day
Fig. 1. (Top) Representation of the number of segments, for the month of
June 2011, recorded in the m1 and m3 files of the DDR dataset. (Bottom)
Percentage of segments of the m3 files that were not present in the m1 dataset;
this mismatch represents situations where there has been a change with respect
to the planned route.
time to ensure a good separation with other traffic in the area,
or has been the result of a last-second decision. Thus, it is
important to assess the length and duration of these segments,
as they are directly related with the quantity of information
that has been lost.
Fig. 2 represents the distribution of the temporal duration (in
seconds) of segments. While 80% of segments have a duration
of less than 120 seconds, it is important to notice the long tail
of the distribution, that is, the significant number of segments
covering more than 10 minutes.
This distribution is global, in the sense that it does not take
into account the geographical position of segments. Clearly,
this aspect can be extremely relevant; if, for instance, all long
segments are located in specific areas that are not of interest
for the study (as, for instance, Atlantic routes), the effective
duration of relevant segments will be lower than expected.
In Fig. 3, the spatial position of segments has been included
in the analysis; the colour of each point represents the mean
duration of segments beginning within a square centred at that
point, and of size 1◦ × 1◦ (for Fig. 3 (Bottom), each cell in
the grid has a dimension of 0.1◦ × 0.1◦).
Although trajectories inside Europe are sampled at a higher
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Fig. 2. Histogram of the duration of segments (in seconds), in a log-log
scale.
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Fig. 3. Representation of the number of segments, for the month of June
2011, recorded in the m1 and m3 files of the DDR dataset.
resolution, it is important to notice that only a few points are
green, that is, few segments have a duration of less than a
minute. This is the first problem that has been encountered
within this project: the use of the DDR dataset of aircraft
trajectories does not provide the best possible source of
information for a reliable safety pattern mining process.
IV. IDENTIFICATION OF ghost FLIGHTS
As a first step towards the identification of safety-related
patterns in the historical ATM data available, some simple
algorithms for detecting conflicts, i.e., situations involving
a loss of separation minima, have been developed and ran
3
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Fig. 4. Cumulative number of conflicts detected in one day of operation, as
a function of the time separation between the two aircraft.
against one day of operations. The simplest one was aimed
at detecting all pairs of aircraft crossing the same significant
point, at the same flight level, with a separation of less than 2
minutes; furthermore, the altitude at which both aircraft have
crossed the same point should have been of at least 20.000 fts,
with both aircraft in the en-route phase: these conditions were
included in order to eliminate events in approach or departure
phases.
5274 pairs of segments fulfilled these conditions; the dis-
tribution of the separation between aircrafts, in seconds, is
represented in Fig. 4. This value is, clearly, abnormally high,
especially if compared to the 1356 events reported to EU-
ROCONTROL in 2009 [6]; but, more important, it reveals
that the information included in the dataset is not completely
trustworthy.
The reason for this mismatch can be found in the definition
of the content of both datasets. As already explained, the
m3 file combines out-of-date information of flight plans,
with updated information originating from radar measurements
when the difference between the real and planned situation
of an aircraft exceeds some given thresholds. Therefore, the
trajectories corresponding to many flights (i.e., of those flights
which have followed the original flight plan) are not correctly
updated, and many unresolved conflicts appear.
Once this problem was identified, a strategy was elaborated
aiming at identifying (and, eventually, delete from the dataset)
those flights that were not correctly updated (ghost flights).
If segments of flights are updated when the planned and ex-
ecuted trajectories differ more than a given threshold, it should
be possible to detect that threshold; after that, all segments that
correspond to a difference (between the information stored in
the m1 and m3 files) lower than such thresholds are marked
as ghost segments, and eventually excluded from the analysis.
In order to simplify the analysis, only a temporal threshold δt
is considered, thus disregarding a potential spatial threshold.
It should be noticed that the actual value of the threshold
δt is not known; nevertheless, in principle, it is possible to
detect such a value, as it must be associated to a phase
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Fig. 5. Representation of the density of conflicts (defined as the number
of conflicts detected in the dataset, scaled by the square of the number of
traffics) as a function of δt′. Note that a clear phase transition appears for
δt′ ≈ 2000s.
transition in the dynamics of the system. Let us suppose that
the value of such threshold is fixed to an arbitrary number
δt′, and that flights that have suffered from delays smaller
than δt′ are deleted from the dataset; in other words, we
just consider the traffic composed by segments fulfilling the
following condition:
abs(Tm1 − Tm3) > δt
′ (1)
where Tm1 and Tm3 are the time at which one aircraft has
crossed a given significant point, according to the m1 and the
m3 files respectively. Once the dataset has been filtered, it is
possible to detect the number of losses of separations, or, more
specifically, the density of such events:
D(δt′) =
nLoS(δt
′)
s(δt′)2
(2)
where nLoS is the number of events identified, and s is the
number of segments in the filtered dataset; notice how both
values are defined as a function of δt′, i.e., of the threshold
used in the filtering process.
The evolution of such conflict density as a function of the
threshold δt′ is represented in Fig. 5. Two different regimes
can be found. First, on the right part, there is a region where
no conflicts are detected; on the contrary, on the left side of
the graph, there is a region with a high number of loss of
separation events. From this, we can make the hypothesis that
the transition from one regime to the other corresponds to the
value of δt′ actually used in the data updating process, i.e.,
δt = 2000s.
In Fig. 6 is plotted the number of conflicts detected, when a
threshold of δt = 2000s is used to filter unreliable segments.
Clearly, the result is more in line with the real situation, and
the number of high-risk conflict has been reduced in two orders
of magnitude.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have reported on work-in-progress on
analysing and filtering DDR data in the context of COMPASS.
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Fig. 6. Cumulative number of conflicts detected in one day of operation, as
a function of the time separation between the two aircraft, after the deletion
of ghost flights detected by the algorithm described in this contribution.
Our results have demonstrated that before they can be used for
any meaningful analysis, DDR data need to be filtered in order
to remove ghost flights and also need to be augmented with
additional data-sources in order to improve their spatial and
temporal resolution.
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